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Purpose:  We intend to study what exactly happens to organizational identity 
construction during a crisis. Thereby we are particularly interested in 
elucidating the influencing factors and levels for identity construction. 
We investigate how organizational identity was deconstructed and 
want to suggest a discussion of the terminology as the notion of 
“identity construction” does not seem to be appropriate in times of 
crisis, but “identity deconstruction”. 
 
Methodology:  The adapted methodology was dominantly objective hermeneutics 
with a critical reading of the empirical material. It was supported with 
discursive elements and critical theory reflections. 
 
Conceptual framework:  The chosen conceptual framework is the identity regulation model put 
forward by Alvesson and Willmott (2002) in combination with chosen 
supplementing models and theories.  
 
Empirical foundation:  The empirical material was generated by means of semi-structured 
interviews on site with a variety of employees concerning their former 
position and function within the by now bankrupt organization. We 
were also able to integrate our own experience with the organization 
and reflective material which we were provided with by former 
employees of the organization.   
 
Summary Findings:  The process of organizational identity construction can be divided 
into two parts. The first part is the dominantly investigated field of 
building an organizational identity based on source(s) of 
identification. The second, often neglected part is the deconstruction 
of organizational identity in which organizational members gradually 
withdraw from sources of identification. Thereby high-skilled workers 
maintain their organizational identity longer than low-skilled workers. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Globalization has imposed a variety of challenges on today‟s corporations. An increasing 
complexity in conjunction with new technologies and a rapidly changing environment force 
companies all over the world to adapt concepts to maintain and to improve their competitiveness 
(Sandberg & Targama, 2007). Companies are founded more frequently than ever, but they also 
disappear faster than ever before through mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies – the modern 
story of “survival of the fittest”. 
As result, identity and identity (de)construction as part of organizational studies has become 
conceivably popular over the last 20 years (Grint, 2000; Lührmann & Eberl, 2007; Alvesson et al, 
2008a). It can indeed be understood as an underlying concept that affects leadership and 
management, human resource, motivation, values and beliefs, organizational images, private life, 
ethics, resistance and many more (Alvesson et al, 2008a) with the questions “Who are we?” 
(Gioia & Thomas, 1996) and “Who am I?” (Cerulo, 1997). The topic of organizational 
deconstruction – a process in which organizational members jointly dissociate themselves from 
sources of identification – is thereby often neglected, but seems equally important with the 
questions “Who have we been?” and “Who have I been?”. Particularly with regard to 
bankruptcies and following business recovery, the field of identity deconstruction becomes 
important in order to understand with which elements of organizational identity new investors and 
new managing boards can continue and construct a new organizational identity. 
 
Definition – Defining the Indefinable 
However, even though the labeling differs from “loyalty” to “self-concepts” and “identity 
construction”, the identity idea is not new and has ever since been intertwined with organizational 
identification (Rotondi, 1975; Stets & Burke, 2000).  In fact, we use the notion of ‘organizational 
identity’ as described in Alvesson & Empson:  
“certain distinctive features, that it differs from others in certain respects over 
time, and that its distinctive features characterize the organization in different 
situations and across various themes, such as decisions, actions, and policies” 
(2008: 2) 
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The process of self-categorization in an organization, a department, a work group or team with 
distinctive features is then called identification in organizational identity theory (Stets & Burke, 
2000). In other words, the identity is the product of the ongoing identification process and identity 
construction, respectively.  
 
Historical Overview - From Closed Systems to Ambiguous Identity 
The research on identity must also be understood in context of management theory and the shift 
from “closed system thinking” to the “open system era” (Peters & Waterman, 1982: 91). In the 
beginning of the last century, studies with Weber and Taylor at its forefront were primarily 
conducted to improve the „organizational system‟, neglecting external forces and the people 
factor (Scott & Davis, 2006). In the middle of the century, researchers like McGregor, Barnard 
and Selznick centered their attention on the social dimension and broke off the idea of a 
homogeneous, passive workforce that waits for orders. In the second half of the last century, 
external circumstances as well as the human factors were focused on to further understand how 
organizations work and how to keep them adaptive in a complex environment (Peters & 
Waterman, 1982).  
There have also been numerous studies on the identity topic. Earlier research was mainly 
focused on understanding “the employees‟ willingness to resist attractive outside offers of 
employment” (Rotondi, 1975: 98) and the illumination of the results of identification like „higher 
satisfaction‟ (Kelman, 1958). Furthermore, researchers tried to “differentiate among identification 
targets in organizations” in order to understand with what employees identify exactly (Brown, 
1969; Patchen, 1970; Rotondi, 1975).  
In the following studies, the focus then shifted towards the organizational identity and self-identity 
as „final products‟ of the identification process (Turner et al, 1987; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & 
Hardie, 1992) with special attention on distinctiveness, continuity and shared “insides” of 
employees (Deetz, 1995: 87).  
In more recent studies, the emphasis has been put on the multifaceted and dynamic character of 
identity (Gioia et al, 2000; Knights & McCabe, 2003), internal and external factors which shape 
identity and identity construction (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Collinson, 2003; Watson, 2008) and 
finally the determination of „identity construction dimensions‟ (Alvesson & Empson, 2008). Even 
though the research on identity in general has revealed multiple aspects, there are still untapped 
fields of tension for investigation like organizational (de)construction. Particularly the latterly 
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mentioned topics still require more in-depth studies to comprehensively understand 
organizational identity and identity construction. 
However, this appears to be conceivable difficult with regard to the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle, often used in quantum physics. In fact, it describes the effect that some processes – 
like identity construction – cannot be observed without actually affecting and biasing it as well 
(Heisenberg, 1927). Moreover, identity and organizational identity are often unconscious 
perceptions and therefore difficult to capture holistically. Lastly, organizational identity can mainly 
be investigated through conversations with single employees and by evaluating individual 
identities. Accordingly, this only provides a snapshot of a number of employees, but may not 
represent the entire organizational identity. Moreover the workers usually intend to remain in the 
company; therefore they might be inclined to display an overly positive picture. 
Apart from the methodological critics for identity research, some authors also argue that research 
on „identity‟ and „identity construction‟ is only an academic fashion without actually providing 
significantly new insights (Alvesson et al, 2008). Considering that the first articles on identity are 
several decades old, current research “could be regarded as a source of revitalization for existing 
research areas” (Alvesson et al, 2008: 6) rather than discovering outstandingly new fields. Other 
critics argue that identity itself is a too ambiguous and complex phenomenon that is “socially 
constructed through interaction” and therefore hard to capture in theories for busy Harvard 
Business Review readers (Lührmann & Eberl, 2007: 117). On the other hand, the process of 
identity (de)construction and identity itself has not yet been comprehensively understood and we 
still only have an idea of what exactly shapes organizational identity and how it can be controlled 
and regulated (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). As inspired students in organizational studies, we 
also intend to contribute a small part to the huge identity construction puzzle by fitting in a piece 
about the deconstruction of organizational identity. 
 
1.2 In Search of Mystery 
We got aware of a relatively young entrepreneurial automotive engineering service provider, 
producing handmade sportscars, next to their core business. An enduring business relation 
enabled the authors (us) to closely follow the continuous downward development of the 
organization and its employees until the company had to file bankruptcy.  
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What was surprising for us, most of the employees did not leave the company under severe 
circumstances. Neither unlawful business practices nor illogical business decisions of the 
management were reason enough for several employees to quit their job. What made them stay 
with this particular organization while waiting several months for their regular salaries against 
promises of the unworldly and inexperienced management? What connected them to the 
organization while hardly receiving any appreciation for their work or engagement? How can it be 
accepted to ignore the own perception of ethical business behavior while being increasingly 
forced to lie for the organization in order to keep the business going? Questions, we were not 
able to answer, but which we felt needed to be explored further.   
 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
Seeing the described phenomena in context of the brought field of identity studies, we are 
particularly interested in elucidating the influencing factors and levels for identity construction in 
this crisis company. Our interest goes somehow in line with the general trend of many 
organizational scholars who previously researched „professional, organizational, managerial and 
occupational identities‟ and recently shifted their focus on analyzing the construction of identity 
(Alvesson et al, 2008). We assume that organizational crisis situations have an impact on 
employees‟ identity, which has not been thoroughly investigated yet and we would like to create 
awareness for this perceived knowledge gap with our paper. Thereby we intend to study what 
exactly happens to organizational identity construction during a crisis. We are also inspired to 
capture how organizational identity is deconstructed and want to suggest a discussion of 
terminology as the notion of “identity construction” does not seem to be appropriate in times of 
crisis, but “identity deconstruction”. 
Going in line with the broad academic work about organizational change, the majority of research 
is concentrated on success stories (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2008), leading to a partly biased 
picture as company failure and downturn is dominant in a competitive, globalized world.  
We are aware of a few studies on identity construction in crisis companies; however, we could 
not find any study specifically focusing on employees‟ identity in crisis companies which have 
already filed bankruptcy with the chance of being restructured. This was reason enough for us 
and supported by a lucky coincidence which we utilized to investigate the „organizational identity 
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(de)construction‟ in a by now bankrupt crisis company. Thereby we hope to solve the mystery we 
described above, why employees did not or very late leave the investigated company. 
Throughout the last two years we were involved in the organization which we used for our 
investigation and were fascinated by the mixture of either absolute willpower to save the 
company or listlessness among the remaining staff members before the company finally had to 
file bankruptcy. Since the company offered a very unique product next to engineering services 
one could easily assume that the product - a handmade sportscar - was the reason for the 
remaining staff to stay in the company. Keeping that in mind, the actual research question is 
discussed in the next section which is further explored in this paper. 
 
1.4 Research Question and Disposition 
Our particular interest in this case, as described above, consequently leads to the main research 
question: 
 How was organizational identity constructed in the investigated company during the 
emerging crisis? 
We furthermore want to narrow down the focus of our research, while approaching the following 
three sub question:  
 What were the sources of identification and how did they develop during the 
crisis? 
 What impact had organizational identity on the employee‟s decision to leave the 
company late or to stay in the company until bankruptcy? 
 Which factors shaped and influenced organizational identity construction in the 
investigated crisis company? 
In order to provide relevant and knowledgeable insights to the stated research questions, the 
following structure is used for our paper. In the background, a broad understanding and overview 
over the research field of identity, its development, trends and latest academic findings about 
identity construction is given. The second chapter provides a deeper theoretical framework of 
relevant theories for this research. After the identity terminology is explored, the identity 
regulation model of Alvesson and Willmott (2002) is introduced followed by level of analysis and 
influencing variables on identity. The third chapter provides our methodological consideration by 
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introducing the reflexive approach with a focus on hermeneutics. Furthermore we explain the 
interview setup, introduce our interview partners and evaluate the validity of our work. In order to 
provide the reader with the necessary understanding of the investigated company, a detailed 
company description is given in the fourth chapter including our own preunderstanding and a 
snapshot of the last months until the company had to file bankruptcy. The fifth chapter consists of 
a two-fold analysis. The first part analyzes the organizational identity construction, followed by 
the second part examining the deconstruction of organizational identity. Both parts are analyzed 
showing the impact off employees and management in this particular case. The sixth and last 
chapter concludes our findings and ends with a brief discussion about the applicability and 
relevance of our findings for other organizations.       
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
This section starts with a review of currently terminology in order to clarify the notion “identity” 
and its organizational context. We proceed with a critical explanation of the model “identity work, 
identity regulation and self identity” as suggested by Alvesson and Willmott (2002) which served 
as source of inspiration of our analysis. The model is complemented with the four-dimensional 
approach to construction of organizational identity by Alvesson and Empson (2008) and a 
consideration of different factors on different levels of analysis. 
 
2.1 Identity Terminology - All the Same? 
What is identity? The simple question encompasses infinite answers which have made 
researchers and students from all sciences think day and night around the world. As a matter of 
fact, the used terminology and adapted research approaches varied across the intellectual 
sources. Sociology, for example, is mainly used to “interpret structures and patterns within which 
identity-related processes unfold” (Ravasi & van Rekom, 2003: 119). Psychology, on the other 
hand, aims more at “understanding the corresponding processes at the level of the individual” 
(Ravasi & van Rekom, 2003: 119). And management theorists, as last example, are inspired to 
develop insights about how to utilize identity in organizational process in various ways (Peters & 
Waterman, 1982). 
In recent years, efforts were taken to join forces between the different sciences in order to clarify 
terminology and to facilitate cross-disciplinary learning (Albert et al, 2000; Ravasi & van Rekom, 
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2003). However, there is still a lot of confusion about the terms like identification, organizational 
identification, identity, organizational identity, identity construction, identification process, self-
identity and organizational commitment eventually. This can mainly be explained with the 
different levels and perspectives of analysis which are discussed in the next section.  
Even though confusion has exacerbated understanding across sciences, different accepted 
definitions of identity and identification research which emerged over the years. A widely adopted 
definition by Albert and Whetten (1985: 266): 
“What the criterion of central character means is that the concept of 
organizational identity, whether proposed by a scientist, by another 
organization, or by the organization itself, must be a statement of identity 
which distinguishes the organization on the basis of something important and 
essential.” 
With other words, an organizational identity is central, distinctive and enduring. This definition, 
however, treats organizational identity as a robust and fixed „thing‟ (Alvesson et al, 2008) and 
neglects the interpersonal and dynamic character. These aspects are taken up in Mills et al‟s 
definition in which “organizational identity is seen as something formed by the interaction and 
construction of meaning between internal and external audiences of the organization” (2005: 3) 
and a successional advancement by Alvesson and Empson (2008) in which organizational 
identity is described as fragmented, malleable and continuous. The shift from a „robust and fixed 
identity thing‟ is also reflected in a change of terminology. In recent years, the notion of “identity 
construction” has become increasingly popular (Alvesson & Empson, 2008; Alvesson et al, 2008; 
Lührman & Eberl, 2007; Howarth, 2002; Cerulo, 1997).  
In our paper, the term “identification” is equally important, but often confused with organizational 
identity (Cole & Bruch, 2006; Kistner, 2005; Ibrahim, 2000). In contrast to organizational identity, 
identification is researched and described more on the level of the individual: 
“Psychological linkage between the individual and the organization whereby 
the individual feels a deep, self-defining affective and cognitive bond with the 
organization as a social entity.” (Edwards & Peccei, 2007: 30) 
In the following explanation, Edwards & Peccei suggest three subcomponents of identification. 
First, the already mentioned “categorization of the self”; second the “integration of goals and 
values of the organization into their own belief system” and third the “affective attachment of the 
individual to the organization” (Edwards & Peccei, 2007: 31).  
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The differentiated approach towards identification allows pinpointing the major difference 
between both terms. Identity is an ever ongoing approach on the individual and organizational 
level. Identification, on the other hand, is a targeted approach of an individual towards an 
organization or team, respectively. 
 
2.2 Identity Regulation, Identity Work & Self Identity 
After the review of terminology, we intend to explore how identity is actually constructed in 
organizations in order to provide a better understanding of the shaping forces. As mentioned 
before, the increasing insecurity and social instability in a dynamic and globalized world demands 
emotional connection and an anchoring center for coherent selves of the organization‟s 
employees (Giddens, 1991). Subsequently, it is not necessarily required to manage the worker‟s 
identity directly, but organizational control can be realized by “managing the „insides‟ – the hopes, 
fears and aspirations” (Deetz, 1995: 87). Based on these assumptions, Alvesson and Willmott 
(2002) developed a model which intends to explain the process of managerial identity regulation 
in organizations. Thereby the role of “new managerial discourses” is pinpointed, which are then 
integrated “into narratives of self-identity” by organizational members (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002: 
622). This process is then termed identity work and the organizational members are labeled 
identity workers, accordingly. With this concept, an omnipotent role of management and 
organization for identity construction is also rejected, because 
 
“Organizational members are not reducible to passive consumers of 
managerially designed and designated identities. Nor do we assume or claim 
that the organization is necessarily the most influential institution in identity-
defining and managing processes.” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002: 621) 
 
However, the organization and management has means for more or less intentional identity 
regulation. Identity regulation is described as procedures and human resource instruments like 
“induction, training and promotion” that have direct or indirect “implications for the shaping and 
direction of identity” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002: 625). The authors suggest nine potential ways of 
identity regulation. 
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As result, employees have become more aware and skeptical of managerial identity regulation 
and subsequently work with their identity whereby they are “continuously engaged in forming, 
repairing, maintaining, strengthening or revising the construction” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002: 
226). In fact, employees attempt to continuously build a consistent and enduring identity despite 
all external insecurities, ambiguity and doubt. The temporary result of identity work and identity 
regulation is described as “precarious self-identity”. Moreover, the multiplicative character of 
identity is to be taken into account, because individuals have a variety of competing and shifting 
self-identities, whereby one becomes temporarily salient (Sveningsson & Alvesson, 2003). The 
entire model is summarized in the following illustration 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 | Adapted from Alvesson & Willmott (2002) 
Illustration 2.1 | Adapted from Alvesson & Willmott (2002) 
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The model clearly shows how identity work, identity regulation and self-identities are interrelated 
and mutually influencing. Particularly for understanding how identity was constructed at our case 
company and explicitly why several organizational members did not leave the company earlier or 
at all, respectively. The model serves as starting point on the micro-level for our later analysis 
with the emphasis on how identity was actually regulated. In order to develop a more 
comprehensive picture, the concept is complemented with Alvesson and Empson‟s (2008) four 
dimensions of identity construction as presented in the following section and various factors on 
different levels of analysis at the end of this chapter. 
 
2.3 A Four-Dimensional Approach to Identity Construction  
Considering the increasing interest in understanding organizational identity, “there is little 
information on how organizations strategically construct organizational identity and what factors 
lead to the construction of organizational identity” (Dhalla, 2007:248). These factors are, if not 
totally ignored, just briefly mentioned, and “not much work on the substantive themes or key 
dimensions around which identity is constructed” is carried out yet (Alvesson & Empson, 2008:2). 
Many scholars describe micro factors and analyze these without taking the broader context into 
consideration which we criticize. 
Mats Alvesson and Laura Empson (2008) use a broader perspective and recently published “four 
brought dimensions that organizational members refer to in constructing their organizational 
identity”; „Knowledge work‟, „Management and Membership‟, „Personal Orientation‟, and „External 
Interface‟ which we also focus on. The presented framework was developed based on a “brought 
ranging inductive study by Empson (2004) into the process of post merger integration within a 
variety of accounting and consulting firms” (Alvesson & Empson, 2008:3). However, the evolution 
of a new organizational identity became focus and finally led to „four core dimensions‟ which is 
further explained in the following paragraphs. 
The first core dimension „Knowledge Work‟ focuses on the core operating resource of a firm. 
Alvesson and Empson define the question “what do we know and how do we work?” reflecting on 
the one hand the form as well as content of an organizational knowledge and on the other the 
work process, in which way the service (as typically for consultancy firms) is delivered to the 
clients (Alvesson & Empson, 2008:5). This dimension is strongly tied to knowledge intensive 
firms such as consultancy companies, stressing services and the work relation with clients. 
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„Management and Membership‟, the second core dimension, focuses on the interface between 
the individual and the organization. “How is an organization managed and how do organizational 
members relate to management and the employing organization?” describes the core of this 
dimension best (Alvesson & Empson, 2008:6). It furthermore considers ideals and motivation of 
employees and to which extent these are affected by management‟s objectives. 
The third core dimension is called „Personal Orientation‟ and is concerned with the impact 
organizational identity has on more „subtle personal elements of an individual‟. It is defined with 
the question “what kind of people are we in the context of the organization?” by Alvesson and 
Empson (2008:6) and considers morality and methodology within the organization.   
The final core dimension „External Interface‟ deals with the question “how are we seen and how 
do we see others?” which offers a self-critical refection on how one might be perceived in an 
outside-inside and intra-organizational context. It is also about how the own organization is 
perceived compared to competitors by the individual.  
Alvesson and Empson themselves argue that their framework is based on knowledge intensive 
firms created, but acknowledge, that they believe “that it has an applicability to organizations 
more generally”, a viewpoint, which we used as basis for our analysis. The following paragraph 
brings up related issues which we believe are worthwhile to be considered while applying this 
model.   
The model provides a new way to approach organizational identity construction and it certainly 
reveals new insights into the „construction processes‟. Thereby, with the adoption of the four 
generic dimensions, unnecessary discussions at the micro-level about unique organizational 
factors are avoided (Alvesson & Empson, 2008). However, as useful as the concept might 
appear, it should also be critically evaluated to what extend valuable contributions can really be 
derived from the conducted study. Alvesson himself emphasizes the dynamic, continuous and 
complex character of identity construction without „fixed and robust‟ structures (Alvesson, 2004; 
Alvesson & Empson, 2008). The question is certainly, if a complex process like identity 
construction with infinite factors and influences can be explained and displayed in a model with 
four generic organizational dimensions. Moreover, the categories are kept rather broad to 
circumvent the already mentioned variations. This in turn also restricts striking new findings 
through the study; even Alvesson himself evaluates the impact of management, work process 
and content, external interface and people orientation in previous works (Alvesson et al, 2008; 
Alvesson, 2004; Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). Therefore we argue that the dimensions should 
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more be considered as a new way of structuring existing knowledge and linking multiple studies 
in the organizational identity construction field. 
In line with our theoretical argumentations of the following sections, we regard the suggested 
organizational dimensions also in a broader context of the wider environment and the individual 
characteristics of the organizational member. As the focus was on organizational identity 
construction, it is quite clear that not all issues of identity construction were considered. However, 
the different levels of analyses have been neglected. The study is mainly based on 
interpretations of interviews with organizational members (Alvesson & Empson, 2008); some 
unconscious and unmentioned parts are therefore potentially not taken into account as well as 
contextual variables. 
At last, we want to point to the „structural circumstances‟ of the study. The dimensions are 
worked out on base of the knowledge-intensive firms with intangible and ambiguous products 
(Alvesson, 2004). Alvesson and Empson (2008) nonetheless argue that the generic core 
dimensions are applicable in more general. We tend to agree on that, but also want to indicate 
that some adaptations might be necessary. In firms with tangible products, for example, a 
product dimension rather than a knowledge dimension is to be discussed. 
The next section discusses potential supplements and complementary concepts to the four 
dimensions with regard to different levels of analyses to prepare the ground for a more 
comprehensive picture on organizational identity construction – taking external and individual 
variables into consideration. 
 
2.4 Level of Analysis - Towards a Comprehensive Picture 
With the review of the suggested four core dimensions, another important aspect concerning 
identity and identification research is revealed. In fact, identity and identification are not 
unidimensional concepts (Edwards & Peccei, 2007), but closely intertwined with the perspective 
and level of analysis (Ravasi & van Rekom, 2003; Empson, 2004). And the identity of an 
individual is something else than the identity of an organization as clarified by Empson: 
“At the individual level, organizational identity represents the distinctive 
attributes which individuals associate with their membership of a particular 
organization. At the organizational level, organizational identity is formed by 
the agglomeration of the distinctive attributes of individual members.” (2004: 
760) 
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Unfortunately, “theory in many of the identity papers is on the level of the collective, whereas the 
data collected are on the level of the individual” (Ravasi & van Rekom, 2003: 30). It does not 
need academic wisdom to notice that the shaping factors of identity are also from different levels. 
Therefore, the next paragraph is to take a deeper look at the differences and commonalties 
across different levels of organizational identity and to prepare ground for our later analysis and 
interpretation. 
With regard to existing theories and research, the impression of multiple, even infinite levels of 
analysis is given; there are many theories reaching from micro levels with the individual and 
working teams in the center to the macro level with focus on organizations, societies and even 
nations (Turner et al, 1994; Foreman & Whetten, 2002). At the individual level, for example, 
personal identity theories analyze individual schemas whereas organizational influence and 
environmental factors were mainly neglected (Markus, 1977; Pratt, 2000; Ashforth, 2001; 
Haslam, 2001; Ravasi & van Rekom, 2003). At the organizational level, it appears to be the other 
way around with studies on institutional theory and „community of practice‟ in which individual 
identity construction is largely neglected (Coleman, 1974; Brown & Duguid, 1991; Czarniawska, 
1997; Rao et al, 2000; Glynn, 2000). In other studies, identity is mainly investigated on the 
societal or environmental level (Barth, 1969; Giddens, 1984; Watson, 2008).  
All studies and research, intend to explain and to understand (organizational) identity 
construction. To build a comprehensive picture of identity construction, however, it is very 
obvious that we should ask questions concerning the interplay of the different levels. In fact, we 
argue that only by analyzing all levels, a complete picture can be drawn. As this would cause 
extraordinary time and effort, we suggest that at least external variables, organizational variables 
and individual variables as kind of a meta-level are analyzed for understanding the organizational 
identity construction of individuals. In the following section, these variables are critically 
explained. 
 
2.5 Factors of Influence on Different Levels 
After the prior paragraph explored different dimensions affecting identity construction in an 
organizational context, the following section intends to highlight influencing factors on the 
individual‟s identity construction in organizations. We felt the need to compile the so far mainly 
separately existing knowledge of chosen authors about factors of influence on identity 
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construction and attempt to provide an overview in this paragraph including the either forgotten or 
purposely neglected context variables.  
What seems to be commonly accepted is a distinction between different levels of analysis 
concerning identity and identification as described earlier in this chapter. Most appropriate 
appears the distinction between „external variables‟, „organizational variables‟ and „individual 
variables‟ which we also use for our analysis. 
Starting with „individual variables‟ including such „trivial‟ things as education and experience, 
leading to a personal preunderstanding (Sandberg & Targama, 2007) which should be taken into 
consideration while analyzing the construction of identity at an individual level. It is not 
understandable in either way why this is mostly not considered or at least made aware of by 
scholars since the own preunderstanding has a noticeable influence on thoughts, behavior and 
actions of the individual. The individuals understanding and perception of the world is also 
shaped by personal circumstances such as family background as Watson (2008) explores in his 
work. A mix of these and further variables is deeply embedded into one‟s personality 
conspicuously influencing the personal side of the conscious or unconscious identity creation. 
We are not making a psychological analysis of self at this point, but believe that it is worthwhile to 
name and consider personal issues in the context of identity construction.    
Seeing the individual with it‟s already numerous identity influencing variables, one has to realize 
and should not underestimate „external variables‟ which are shaping the individual and 
respectively its identity construction. The expression „the farmer would not leave his farm‟ was 
absolutely true some decades ago and is still valid for some rural areas, whereas nowadays an 
increasing global village is created, leading to diversified backgrounds with various so far 
unknown influences on the personal development. Massive changes in the educational as well as 
commercial sector revolutionize the established way of life and might reshape one‟s values and 
in the end, the above described preunderstanding. One example considering the commercial 
sector is the downtrend of “long-term relational contracts in favor of shorter-term transactional 
ones, and the growth of boundaryless careers” which Arthur and Rousseau describe as result of 
the ongoing globalization. (1996 in Albert et al, 2000:14). We question the fact that organizational 
scholars often do not consider the economic situation in their analysis of identity construction, 
such as the financial crisis we are facing right now. It is surely an extreme case, but can have 
noticeable impact on the identity construction of bankers or employee in the financial sector at 
this point. Alvesson and Empson acknowledge in their research that “organizational identity can 
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provide a focus for member identification in an insecure employment context” which is important 
considering crisis situations (2008:3). We illustrate this recent example to create awareness of 
external variables as we call it in our paper which also includes general trends such as 
environmental or industry trends. Foreman and Whetten suggest in their work, that the 
organizational identity is already influenced by the industry itself. They argue that “organizations 
within a given sector adopt similar institutionalized practices, and this isomorphic process leads 
to the institutionalization of the broader organizational form, resulting in the form itself being 
considered as „taken-for-granted‟ and having an identity of its own” (2002:622).  
Another important factor as we suggest is the impact of the organization‟s location and its 
regional infrastructure, once more in the context of a whole which could be set differently for each 
case, but should not be ignored. The whole could be the country itself with its culture, values, 
common understanding and „taken for granted‟ assumptions. Meta variables such as society 
culture, unemployment rates and the general context of the organization have undoubtedly 
impact on the personal identity creation for us. It is surely difficult if not impossible to clearly 
analyze, identify and measure the various influence, their weighting and impact in the process, 
but leaving them unmentioned might lead to questionable interpretations.   
However, next to „external‟ and „individual variables‟, „organizational variables‟ are more explicit 
focused on by organizational scholars. “It is likely that this is where organizations have the 
greatest impact and exert the greatest influence on the construction of organizational identity 
since organizations can generally direct and control intra-organizational factors” (Dhalla, 
2007:253). Firstly, it is important to realize that “although identities are constructed within 
organizations, organizational members are strongly influenced by their interactions with 
outsiders” (Alvesson & Empson, 2008:6). This phenomena is explored by different scholars 
including Hatch and Schultz (2002:1004) arguing further that identity is the “immediate result of 
conversation between organizational self-expressions and mirrored stakeholder images”. This 
allows a basic understanding of the importance of created and perceived images for the 
individual employee within the own and of other organizations.   
Alvesson and Empson use a rather unique way to explain these images. They introduce the 
question “How do we see others?” which reflects the perception of the own organization in 
comparison to others. They argue that “in all identity constructions there is an implicit element of 
comparison and distancing – identity is about claims to distinctiveness” which might be implicit 
and weak (2008:6). We suggest replacing „we‟ by „I‟, to get closer to the individual while asking 
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“How do I (as a part of we) see others?” instead. Dhalla (2007) uses the example of industry 
rankings and points out that organizational members are ongoing and consciously comparing 
their organization with others and depending on the perception of the „others ranking‟, the own 
organizational identity might be influenced. Another puzzle piece leading to the individual 
organizational identity is illustrated by the question „How are we seen?‟, reflecting “how 
organizational members believe themselves to be perceived by others (i.e. clients, competitors, 
and potential recruits)” (Alvesson & Empson, 2008:6). It should also be rephrased in our case 
into “How am I seen by outsiders?” to provide an individual assessment. Dhalla shows the impact 
while arguing as Dutton et al (1994), that “consistent, positive feedback from external sources 
[…] on the firm‟s operations or achievements, will create a favorable organizational image, which 
will help form a strong organizational identity” (2007:20) a view which we share.  
Organizational members can be described as “part of both the internal and external audience” 
being able to decode „signals and information‟ of the organization in context with information they 
„garner‟ from other sources, leading to their individual perception of the own organization 
(Fomburn & Shanley, 1990 in Dhalla, 2007:250). Internal as well as external communication is 
also considered to be essential for the organization as a whole to supporting culture and reflect 
structures as well as being a connection between the company and its internal and external 
members (Balmer & Gray, 2000). 
Another noticeable impact on the organizational identity of the individual is the management 
itself. What was introduced by Alvesson and Willmott (2002) as managerial identity regulation 
can also be turned around to show influencing variables on individual‟s organizational identity 
construction. They argue that an appropriate work orientation such as pay or career opportunities 
as well as a flat hierarchy or teamwork can have noticeable impact on the identity. They also 
describe categorization and definition of employees, company rules of conduct next to others as 
managerial opportunities to shape organizational identity on a mainly collective level being 
differently perceived by the individual. The elementary question is according to Alvesson and 
Empson (2008:6) “…how is the organization managed and how do organizational members 
relate to management and the employing organization? Specifically why do organizational 
members work and to what extent are their ideals influenced by, or independent of, the objectives 
of management”.  
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3. Methodological Consideration 
This section provides methodological considerations on which this paper is based. It starts with a 
brief explanation of the reflexive approach chosen for the interpretation of the empirical material 
and supportive methodological theories. We continue with deeper insights in objective 
hermeneutics and the hermeneutic circle in order to move forth and back between the existing 
theory and our own findings. At last, the process how the empirical material was generated is 
explained, including the interview setup and a brief description of the key actors. 
 
3.1 A Reflexive Approach 
There is a variety of different qualitative methodologies available to approach research questions 
scientifically. If researchers, however, choose a particular methodology and entirely neglect 
others, the risk of “reflective reductionism” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007) is created through a 
single-sided approach. We want to avoid a one-sided emphasis through supporting our research 
with multiple theoretical frameworks. This also creates the opportunity to develop more possible 
interpretations and thereby to generate a deeper understanding of the empirical material. This 
implicates epistemological as well as ontological considerations under the assumption that we 
can actually observe and explore the social reality and that our theoretical contributions and 
conclusions – even though derived from a very particular case – be valuable for further studies 
and research.  
Even though we are in favor of pluralistic methods and favor a combination of different 
approaches that are explained briefly in the following paragraphs, our dominant core method is 
hermeneutics to explore the observed phenomena through “knocking on the text[s]” of our 
empirical material (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007). As part of the hermeneutic reflection, we use a 
variety of discursive elements to explore distinctive statements in more depth as well as in a 
broader context. We also want to acknowledge that the selected text parts and our transcripts 
may generate a potential discourse on for us interesting themes as well.  
After the in-depth discussion of the most relevant methodologies and the hermeneutical 
approach and implications on our research, we describe our research process in accordance with 
the abductive principle, whereas we first conducted interviews and then developed potential 
hypothesis to understand and explain the observed phenomena (de Regt, 1994). 
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For decades, organizations all over the world have been studied with different, similar and surely 
uncounted research methods. In the attempt to pinpoint “new vistas for qualitative research”, 
Alvesson and Sköldberg (2007) describe several methods in detail and suggest a “quadri-
hermeneutic approach” to ensure 360° interpretations. Apart from our core method that is 
explained in the following section, it makes sense to take a brief look at Critical Theory and post 
structuralism. The latter methods are to some extent relevant and value-adding to our analysis in 
order to create a broader picture with an ontological stance. 
The Critical Theory approach intends to critically analyze existing social structures in a holistic 
context with the aim to uncover oppressions and power relations (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007). 
The critical theory perspective is thereby concerned with broader political and ideological issues 
rather than exploring the empirical material in-depth. By doing so, the existing social structures 
and realities are challenged in order to create a better society and to improve the status quo 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). For the reason that our analysis is based on empirical material from the 
studied company, the wider society would be to an extent marginalized by only using 
hermeneutics. Therefore we use some glance of critical theory in our analysis in appropriate 
parts to comprehend and supplement our hermeneutic interpretations.  
The post structuralism approach is characterized by a critical evaluation of structuring elements 
of society and particularly the pre-conditions for structuring. Thereby structures and existing 
discourses are considered to be dynamic and instable rather than static (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
2007). In particular the elements of Foucauldian discourse analysis are used in order to 
illuminate deeper meanings of very specific text parts for our interview partners and their 
surrounding environment, respectively.  
 
3.2 Understanding Parts and Wholes 
The purpose of the selected methodology was to create a comprehensive understanding of what 
actually happened to the identity construction in the later described crisis company. The choice of 
„hermeneutics‟ as core method was therefore very clear; in fact hermeneutics allows a very 
detailed analysis of empirical material with a close connection to texts, transcripts and speeches. 
Our epistemological pretense is particularly emphasized through the concepts of “Einfühlung” 
(empathy) and “Verstehen” (understanding) (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007). In particularly the 
latter concept underlines the subjectivity of knowledge and emphasizes the socially constructed 
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reality, also in organizations. The recurring notion of „understanding‟ is then also reflected in the 
spiral (circle) of objective and alethic hermeneutics that is explained in the following. 
Objective hermeneutic circle suggests the beginning with some part of the empirical material and 
to relate it then to the whole as “the part can only be understood from the whole and, the whole 
can only be understood from the parts” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007: 53). With every new part-
whole analysis, new aspects and interpretations are ideally revealed. 
Alethic hermeneutics can be translated into the circular relationship of pre-understanding and 
understanding. The interpreter continuously returns with a newly developed understanding to the 
initial „departure point‟ and seeks new interpretations. The understanding thereby becomes pre-
understanding for the next round in the hermeneutic circle and so on. 
Even though both methods are part of hermeneutics, a major difference is the relationship 
between the interpreter and the analyzed text. As it is already in the name, in objective 
hermeneutics it is assumed that the interpreted object (text, transcript, speech) and the 
interpreting subject (author, interpreter) are independent entities. In alethic hermeneutics, 
however, both interpreted objects as well as interpreting subject mutually influence each other 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007). We believe that the synthesis of both approaches leads to a more 
comprehensive picture for the reader with an invitation to think further about other alternatives. 
Both approaches have “diametrically opposite standpoints” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007: 52), 
objective as well as alethic hermeneutics encourage a multi-angle permeation of the empirical 
material through “emerging patterns of interpretation, textual analysis, dialogue and sub-
interpretations” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007: 65). In our analysis, both methods are adapted 
without preference. 
A last remark on the hermeneutic circle: In contrast to 
the traditional description of the “hermeneutic circle”, 
we took a critical position towards the model as a 
„circle‟ implies a return to a former departure point. 
The analysis, however, is to be more understood as 
a „spiral‟ where acquired knowledge is used to extend 
the picture and new points of departure are formed 
for further interpretations (Radnitzky & Giorgi, 1973). 
Illustration 3.1 | Adapted from Alvesson & Sköldberg (2007) 
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3.3 Forth and Back Between Theory and Practice 
On a more generic level, our interpretations are characterized by a dynamic interaction between 
different interpretive levels. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2007) describe the first level as 
“construction of data” or close work with the empirical material in order to develop “multiplicity of 
interpretation” (p. 255). The second layer specifies the findings and carves out dominant 
hypotheses of interpretations and argumentations. In the third level, space for critical reflections 
and interpretations with less focus on the empirical, but therefore more to the wider context, is 
given. The fourth level then invites to author‟s critical self-reflection on the developed 
interpretations and potential biases.  
The characteristic of being „dynamic interactive‟ is thereby an important aspect in reflexive 
methodology. In fact, findings in a specific level are played forth and back similar to the 
hermeneutic circle and interpretations are strengthened or deferred accordingly.  
Even though we aspire a thorough analysis and breadth of aspects, we limit our interpretations to 
the first and second level with discursive elements to the third level as we otherwise endanger to 
lose the reader‟s attention over to many and perhaps less relevant aspects. In the next section, 
the practical approach of our study is outlined and some source criticism is exerted to make 
readers aware of the adapted processes and potential biases of our investigation. 
 
3.4 Process - Description of The Method 
Throughout the past two years, we were intensively following the development of the company, 
which we chose to become center of our investigation by the time it filed bankruptcy in early 
2009. The astonishing self-scarification of various employees throughout the last months of the 
organization awoke our interest and consequently led to the above stated research question.  We 
did not consider this opportunity at the first place, but the more we discussed this surprising 
phenomenon, the more obvious became the potential this case offers for our work. Based on the 
prior work experience within the company we still have great access to employees, which was 
absolutely essential for an investigative approach we aimed at. 
Next to intensive desk research and the realization that hardly any in depth study is published 
about „identity (de)construction‟ in crisis companies which are facing bankruptcy, our first step 
was to perform intensive interviews with a variety of employees of the company. We selected the 
interview partners based on their hierarchical position, their functional responsibility and their 
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length of tenure within the organization, our impression of their honesty in an interview scenario 
and the fact if they already quit their job before the company filed bankruptcy or stayed until the 
insolvency administrator ended all remaining work contracts. We carefully chose a brought range 
of employee reaching from upper management to shop floor workers in the relatively flat 
organization for our interviews. Semi structured and open ended questions were used to capture 
relevant experience, feelings and opinions which we used for a qualitative and reflexive analysis. 
The interviews were carried out face to face in restaurants or bars which provided a rather 
pleasant atmosphere, following Svenningson‟s (2009) favorable interview technique 
recommendation. Each interview was audio recorded and could therefore be later on used for a 
detailed analysis next to notes which were taken on spot. Two interviews hat to be conducted 
with more modern means, since some former employee already found new jobs in various parts 
of Germany. We decided to use the voice over IP phone software Skype™ since we know the 
interviewees personally and while considering the relatively short time we had to finalize this 
paper. These interviews were also recorded for a detailed analysis.    
Throughout these Interviews, we learned that the last remaining employees started to exchange 
e-mails with each other when the company filed bankruptcy, expressing their emotions and 
thinking about the process within and their time with the organization. They created an endless 
seeming „reply all e-mail chain‟ which can be read as a sort of reflexive story providing insides of 
the last month and even years of the company. Interestingly, also former employees who left the 
company years ago were invited to join this „e-mail therapy‟ as it was described by one of the 
interviewees. We got access to this material which is highly valuable for our study, since it was 
created unasked and exclusively based on employees own initiative.  
Furthermore, we are in the unique position that one of us worked with the company for about one 
year and got familiar with the company culture, practices and internal politics, which gave us a 
certain preunderstanding and granted access as earlier described. Being aware of the possible 
bias, we decided that the interviewing is done by the second person, not being too related to the 
company which allowed a more neutral basis for the interviews. Follow up questions were stated 
by both interviewers to get a deeper understanding and to bring up aspects which might have 
been neglected otherwise.     
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3.5 Interview Setup 
We developed an interview scheme which can be divided into three sections. The first section 
contains general questions about the interviewee‟s position and function, followed by more 
detailed questions about the individual work relationship with the company. The second part 
consists of questions about identity which is our main interest, asking about expectations, 
motivational factors and the development of these over time. We rounded off the interviews with 
questions about the management of the company and the perceived impact on identity issues 
and some hypothetical questions about the possible future of the company and product.  
An average interview took between 60 to 90 minutes, depending on the availability and level of 
motivation of the partly workless interviewees. As earlier mentioned, restaurants and bars were 
chosen to generate a pleasant atmosphere which mainly led to an intimately conversation 
allowing deep insights. Except a period of about 30 minutes about management insights, we 
were allowed to record all conversations while guaranteeing the anonymity of the interviewees. 
The interviews were purposely recorded to allow an interview analysis in a quiet environment 
afterwards. Notes were taken during the interview to pin down gestures and other observations 
which cannot be grasped with an audio recorder. 
 
3.6 Interview Partner  
In this section we want to round off the reader‟s necessary preunderstanding while introducing 
our interview partners briefly. We promised them anonymity and were able to realize this without 
data distortion. We purposely selected interviewees on different organizational levels, to cover a 
brought part on the organization.  
Engineer: Worked about three years for the organization and left the company short before the 
bankruptcy. Started as student trainee and became freelancer, but was treated as normal 
employee. Strong regional focus and family ties. He never finished his engineering studies which 
were pushed aside to fully concentrate on the job, following the personal goal to get a leading 
position in the organization which never happened.    
Leading Engineer: Worked about four years for the organization and left the company one year 
before the bankruptcy. Started with an internship, became graduate, student trainee and 
accepted a leading position as fresh graduate. He did not initially plan to accept any offer based 
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on the temporarily critical company situation at that time, but could not withstand. Free mover, 
not family tied at that time.  
Administrative Staff 1: Worked about six years for the organization and stayed until bankruptcy. 
Started with an internship, became student trainee and was finally regularly employed in a 
leading position. Strong regional affiliation, but not family tied based on heavy overtime and 
absolute self-sacrifice for the organization. The personal dream was to establish an unknown 
brand from Saxony internationally. He worked next to the initial position in various functions to 
compensate leaving employees in order to keep the business going.  
Administrative Staff 2: Worked about one year for the organization and left short before the 
bankruptcy. Regional and family tied. 
Shop floor worker: Worked about five years for the organization and stayed until bankruptcy. He 
started as part of a governmental re-education program and became executing staff in various 
positions. The first two years were governmentally paid before the contract was converted in a 
regular employed. Regional bounded with focus on a short „Anfahrtsweg‟ which means way to 
work.   
Mechanic: Worked about three years for the organization and stayed until bankruptcy. He left his 
prior employer to start in the organization following a personal dream of being able to assemble 
new cars. He received the job offer totally unexpected, one year after sending an application to 
the organization‟s sister company without any response. He is regional and family tied, but 
financially backed up by his full time working wife. 
 
3.7 Validity, Objectivity and Generalization  
The tripartite relationship “reality-source-researcher” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007) in qualitative 
research is problematic concerning the objectivity and validity of a study.  Validity is defined as 
the level of authenticity concerning the reflection of the studied phenomenon (McNeill & 
Chapman, 2005). The possible distortion of information, which is called source criticism in a 
hermeneutical context, could lead to a skewed reproduction or interpretation of the available 
information.  
Alvesson distinguishes between „remnants‟ and „narrating‟ sources and argues that remnant 
sources cannot be exposed to subjective distortion, whereas the later, which we mainly used, are 
exposed to the risk of distortion (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007).  A possible distortion in our case 
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is first of all the language which we on the one hand used to present our findings in form of this 
thesis and on the other the language which is used to perform our interviews. Since we are both 
German, and the investigated company is also located in Germany, we could reduce this 
possible translation bias to a certain extent compared to a multinational team for example. The 
Saxon accent was still a challenge at some point, but the audio recorded tapes help to reveal the 
content error free. The results, which we present at this point in English, could be source of more 
bias, owned to the fact that English is not our mother tongue which might lead to 
misunderstandings among native or other international speaker.  
Another interesting aspect is the timing of our interviews, which were scheduled after the 
company already filed bankruptcy and after all remaining employee lost their jobs. It might have 
had an impact on the provided answers by the interviewees. We noticed that hardly any emotions 
came up while speaking about the company and it somehow sounded like speaking about a 
relatively neutral, objective and expected bankruptcy, whereas all of them lost some month salary 
and their employment of cause. The distance between their actual employment and work in the 
company and our interviews was about one month and respectively longer for those interviewees 
who left the company earlier. Moreover, the company situation was critical in the last one and a 
half years, which might have overlaid or influenced their initial perception of the company during 
successful times.  
We used our own preunderstanding to see the interviews in context of the organization. With this 
knowledge it was possible to ask follow up questions on unclear answers. The clearly divided 
roles in the interview situation, as described above, helped to perform on the one hand relatively 
unbiased interviews and on the other hand ensured trustworthy and valuable information for this 
paper.  
 
Generalization 
In this investigative study, we aim at resolving a particular and in its way unique phenomenon. 
The empirical material and respectively our findings are peripherally discussed in current theories 
and models on organizational identity. We were particularly interested to understand the later 
described happenings in depth, but have not intended to provide any foundation for analytical 
generalization. However, we are sure that the general findings can also be transferred to other 
crisis organizations. That is why we understand our research paper as incentive for further 
research to draw appropriate generalizations with generic value.  
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4. Case Company Description 
This section is meant to provide the reader with the necessary preunderstanding of the empirical 
material to either follow or oppose our arguments and conclusions which we draw at the end of 
this investigative case. We feel that this unique case offers mind cracking phenomena which are 
worth to be deeper explored and findings which are in case applicable to other organizations. 
The next paragraph provides a general background including the development of the 
organization including a personal preunderstanding followed by a „snapshot‟ of the organizational 
situation around the time of our study. 
 
4.1 Spectacular Founding till Bankruptcy - The Development at a Glance  
Motor vehicles from Saxony or „Autoland Sachsen‟ as it is called in Germany, have a long lasting 
history. August Horch, a pioneering engineer, started the Saxon automobile tradition in 1904. 
Nowadays, Volkswagen, Porsche, BMW and numerous mid-sized suppliers are operating in 
Saxony which accounts for 20 percent of Germany‟s automotive and supplier industry.  
About a century later, after August Horch started to innovate the automotive production, two 
„West-German‟ engineering students realized their dream to develop a puristic sportscar as their 
graduation assignment.  
“From a diploma thesis to an automobile series production – that sounds like a 
stroke of genius of the two „garage tinkerer‟. But the business concept of the 
two founders is as planned and thought-out as the development of their 
unique sportscar.” (Recognized business magazine - two years after the 
company was founded)  
They privately assembled a prototype in the nineties and got the chance to display their project at 
a recognized German motor show, which created promising feedback and finally led to the 
possibility to establish an engineering service provider. A location in Saxony was chosen by the 
two young graduates to build on the German and regional automotive tradition and to be able to 
use generous governmental funding opportunities which were at that time available for any 
business which was moved or established in the not so developed eastern part of the reunited 
Germany. 
The business concept was developed to offer engineering services as core competency, next to 
producing the unique sportscar as „business card‟ to demonstrate their engineering service range 
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and to proof their level of quality. It was decided to realize the own sportscar project as mean of 
differentiation in form of a small volume series next to the main business unit. The driving force 
was the enthusiastic and entrepreneurial spirit of the two young and freshly graduated founders.  
Their competence was clearly of an engineering or rhetorical nature having strong deficits in 
organizational and financial issues considering their inexperienced „trial and error‟ management 
of the last years. Their decision-making was autocratic whereas the tolerance concerning results 
was high and control hardly existing. The management‟s greenness when it comes to business 
issues led to chaotic and increasingly unstructured business practices in the end. 
The organization always had a relatively flat organizational form. The founders divided technical 
and administrative issue among them and employed further key personal (head of sales, head of 
marketing, head of production, head of finance, and head of logistics) with various assisting staff 
members and internees in their best years. Throughout the crisis years 2007-2009 numerous 
assisting staff members left the organization which forced the former „heads of…‟ to do the entire 
work themselves leading to a repositioning of management levels. Internees and trainees were 
not hired anymore and graduates left the organization based on delayed payments, missing 
management feedback and the general increasingly chaotic atmosphere in the organization.          
The organizational culture among employee got somehow strengthened, as we explore deeper in 
the next chapter, whereas responsibilities were increasingly shifted by employees themselves to 
be able to solve the daily business issues.  
At this point we just want to make the reader aware of a prestigious product of the young and 
energetic company, having a fantastic story of their own creation, being able to successfully 
fascinate interested customers, political decision makes and corporation partners. This is 
reflected in the fact that the company was awarded with honorable prices for the company start-
up and the sportscar design reflecting the initial public interest and respect based on the 
sportscar prototype.  
“The order books are filled for the next three years enabling the by now 40 
employee company, which always was in the black from their first year on, to 
face a promising future.” (Award press release - five years after the company 
was founded) 
This gained publicity of the puristic sportscar could never be transferred into unit sales, which led 
to the decision to develop a new sportscar, this time with more luxury features such as automatic 
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gearing, airbags, air condition and a multimedia and navigation option which its puristic 
predecessor did not offer at all.  
The final production of the entirely new car started already one year later and several national 
and international distribution partners could be attracted and contracted with binding demo car 
purchases. The engineers commonly argue from today‟s viewpoint, that the car was still in a beta 
phase but not ready to be sold to final customers.  
Monetary problems of the company after several disputes of the young founders with various 
investors and stakeholders led to delayed delivery schedules. This combined with massive 
quality issues resulted on top in dissatisfied partners and clients claiming warranty issues which 
caused extraordinary costs. This downturn trend peaked throughout 2008 when employees were 
sent home or were forced to do short-time work.  
“Just in 2008, more than a dozen law suits of employees and suppliers against 
the company were registered, based on outstanding debts. The management 
paid the salaries on average two to three month late…” (Local newspaper - one 
year before the bankruptcy) 
The company in the end had to file bankruptcy in early 2009 after the latest dispute with a 
renewable energy enterprise which became investor. The management of the investing company 
realized the realistic financial situation of the organization short after their commitment and 
stopped the agreed on payments which led to the bankruptcy of the organization.  
 
4.2 Our Personal Preunderstanding and Experience – A Source for Validation  
We, the authors of this paper, got aware of the company based on an interesting article in an 
online magazine, describing the unique story of a small sportscar manufacturer. The portrait 
niche product and the development as illustrated above created a lasting interest which led to our 
involvement in the organization. It was a mixture of respect of the achieved, a for us brilliant 
product design and the business potential we saw – as many others – for the future of the young 
enterprise.  
More than two years ago in 2007, we visited the company the first time to discuss opportunities 
and to agree on working with the organization. It was impressive to see sales people having a 
glance from their desk on the shop floor workers actually building the cars which they sell. It was 
a young, friendly and somehow „family like organization‟ under „one roof‟ creating a pleasant first 
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impression, somewhere in a relatively rural area offering plenty of space for test-drives. We did 
not have the chance of a test-drive by that time, but the product convinced us – as many others – 
and we followed the organization from that point onwards until it had to file bankruptcy about two 
years later. 
 
4.3 A Snapshot of The Last Month of The Organization 
Some 10 years after the successful start of the organization, the last months and even years 
looked different. The involuntarily downsized enterprise consisted in the last month of operation 
of one remaining engineer, one sales manager and several shop floor workers besides the two 
founders of the prior 50 to 70 employee enterprise. The remaining employees ignored clear signs 
of a menacingly bankruptcy which was the reason for dozens of others to leave the organization 
throughout the last year before the company was finally closed by the insolvency administrator in 
early 2009. 
“I can‟t really explain the reason or give an answer why I stayed in the 
organization… when looking back, it was stupid, wasn‟t it?” (White collar 
worker)  
The relatively young and inexperienced management – two founders being engineers – lost 
increasingly control about the financial situation of the company, leading to irrational and 
hindering decisions which made the company situation even worse.  
“The main focus became to collect as many customer prepayments as 
possible without consideration if a product could finally be delivered, it did not 
matter at all.” (White color worker) 
Business-, but especially payment practices shifted into an unethical or criminal behavior. Just 
bills with immediate effect on the organization‟s daily business were considered to be in case 
paid. The management even encouraged the purchasing department to find remunerated 
supplier to place new orders for needed car components instead of paying off old debts first. 
Orders at new suppliers were purposeful placed with high order quantities since “it would not be 
paid anyways” (White collar worker). The first shipment usually works while paying after delivery, 
a business practice which was heavily abused. This company practice led to various lawsuits of 
partner and supplier against the organization. 
“Ethics is none of my business… the two founders have to cope with their lies 
and business practices” (White collar worker)   
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As result, it became common practice that several suppliers only accepted direct cash payment 
for ordered car components. The required amount was either handed out on an individual basis 
by one of the founders who was present at site or had to be withdrawn at a nearby cash machine 
with one of the founder‟s electronic cash cards. These cards were frequently blocked and 
replaced on a regular basis. Since several car components had to be collected throughout an 
increasing supplier territory, the production became increasingly ineffective. Employees were 
ordered to go to „work‟ which meant more often cleaning of the production hall since no required 
parts were available for the mainly already customer prepaid and delayed cars. Days passed by 
while waiting „jobless‟ at work and colleges started to intensively socialize in order to get the shift 
over which was nothing exceptional throughout the past year.  
“…honestly, I was too lazy to apply at other organizations, but I should have 
sent applications already one year prior, since one could have foreseen that 
the company would not last long anymore…” (Blue collar worker) 
When money was available, usually without anybody really knowing where it was from, it led to a 
continuation of the production in a relatively normal way until the money was „quickly gone‟ and 
the above described situation emerged again. The described downwards trend got worse over 
time, leading to delayed salaries and short time work before the company finally had to file 
bankruptcy.  
 
Conclusion 
Although the company passed dreamlike years, the reality in 2008/09 looked different. The 
extraordinary high stuff turnover of the last months before the bankruptcy is understandable, 
letting us wonder even more about employees staying in the organization while ignoring 
outstanding salaries, having hardly any work to do in their cold and unheated offices throughout 
the wintertime, since several bills stayed unpaid. Our focus is the impact of a crisis situation on 
the individual organizational identity. We use this rather extreme case to analyze the 
organizational identity (de)construction on an individual basis considering recent theories 
combined with our thoughts and findings. 
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5. Analysis 
The process of organizational identity construction is highly complex. Any analysis in general and 
our case in particular can therefore only highlight certain aspects of this process. In order to 
provide the reader with a more comprehensive picture and a deeper understanding about the 
impact of organizational identity and other influencing factors on the employees during the crisis, 
we analyze and interpret different levels of the case. We start on the organizational level and 
strive to understand how organizational identity was constructed and shaped. Moreover, we 
reflect on how organizational identity was deconstructed, which organizational factors lead to 
deconstruction and how this was reflected in the organizational identity. The framework 
suggested by Alvesson and Willmott (2002) is thereby taken as source of inspiration. This part of 
the analysis is complemented with a brief analysis of different employee categories. The last part 
is then to elucidate to what extent external variables influenced identity construction and some 
employee‟s decision not to leave the company until the last months. 
 
Towards a strong organizational identity? 
A recall on theory suggests that organizational identity is enduring, distinctive and central (Albert 
& Whetten, 1985). The investigated case of the car manufacturer fulfilled all these criteria. The 
company was very distinctive through a unique product and, as small series manufacturer, also 
distinctive from the traditional German automobile industry. The identity was also to an extent 
enduring and central, as it was the ultimate objective of the involved employees to develop and 
establish a new automobile in Germany and the world from the foundation to bankruptcy. 
Subsequently, the presumption to find a strong organizational identity with reference to Albert 
and Whetten appeared to be very plausible (1985). In our investigation, we were interested to 
explore how exactly the organizational identity was constructed and what happened to it when 
the firm approached bankruptcy. Thereby we analyze and interpret the rise and fall of 
organizational identity – or as we term it “reconstruction” and “deconstruction” – with regard to 
the nine modes of identity regulation (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002), which had marginal influence 
on the individual and organizational identity. We further elaborate on a categorization of the 
employees and the “stable” variable in identity (de)construction.  
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5.1 Identity Construction  
The shift from an engineering service provider towards a car manufacturer 
Initially, the management‟s and employees focus was on engineering services, leading to various 
prototypes for major automobile companies and respectively noticeable financial resources. The 
engineering department consisting of various employees was working on various automotive 
projects simultaneously. Projects for major car manufacturer and other clients were the core 
business, next to the own sportscar project. Source for employee identification was the 
organization and its history combined with the own profession. 
The company‟s main business changed when the management had increasingly problems with 
engineering service clients, leading to lawsuits and financial shortcomings, and encountered 
massive problems to acquire new projects. Sales problems with the own unique sportscar came 
on top since it was rejected by the desired target group.  
This negative development led to discussion between management, sales/marketing staff and 
engineers whereby the decision to further adapt the sportscar to customer needs emerged. This 
unintentionally led to an entire new sportscar with an award winning design. The majority of the 
engineering department‟s employees were redistributed from extern projects to jointly work for 
the new sportscar. They started to reconstruct their identity accordingly more towards the 
sportscar project, away from the shrinking and struggling engineering department and the 
organization as a whole, a shift we want to explore deeper in the following section. 
 
Management Contribution to Organizational Identity  
Considering the impact of management on the organizational identity reconstruction from the 
organization towards the sportscar project, one has to question the management‟s involvement in 
the decision to focus on the sportscar project. Why did the management shift their focus away 
from their core business - automotive engineering services - strongly towards the development of 
the own sportscar? It can be assumed that the client acquisition which was in management‟s 
hands became increasingly unsuccessful and their employee should get some intermediate work. 
The unsellable sportscar prototype might have further affected the management‟s ego that did 
not want to realize a costly mistake. 
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We do not want to explore the management‟s motivation deeper at this point, but it can be 
assumed that it was a mixture of the engineering department‟s know-how and sales staff 
experience which led to a totally new sportscar in the end. It was a strategic reorientation, initially 
encouraged by management through reassigning workforce, but from that point on driven 
through internal organic growth based on the emergence of a potentially more attractive source 
of identification which was later on just referred to as “our baby”, meaning the collectively created 
new sportscar. 
“We initially just wanted to replace the old sportscar‟s engine with a better one, 
having apparently such massive impact on the car body, that this was heavily 
adjusted […] in the end somehow leading to a new vehicle concept […] and it 
finally got a new design – our baby was born” (administrative staff) 
Except the visionary approach when it comes to the company history and the development of the 
commencing sportscar prototype, one can say that the management did not intentionally use 
what Alvesson and Willmott (2002) describe as identity regulation to shape their organization. 
Unfortunately, they somehow shaped not intentionally the organizational identity of their 
employees through offering multiple distinctive sub-identities under the umbrella of their 
organizational identity for different types of employees.  Engineers could develop “their baby”, 
marketing and sales could follow the “unique possibility to establish a new brand internationally” 
and mechanics even got money for their “passion to assemble an entire car” not only 
components as large volume supplier do it. All this provided fantastic identification opportunities 
with the organization with the core to establish an own automobile in the world.     
In fact, the absence of management was described as:  
“The management was 99% of the day in their „Oval Office‟ (management 
office)” (leading engineer)  
“The management was never present […] they only administrated us” (shop 
floor worker) 
This had a positive impact on organizational identity construction as employees were even given 
more freedom to follow their interpretation and understanding of their work which just sometimes 
collided with the management. Thereby the earlier mentioned organic growth of organizational 
identity was fertilized. As the organizational identity was not quite regulated, employees found it 
easier to integrate the organizational identity in their own identity and to bring in their individual 
identity into the organizational identity. The only managing style, as it was occasionally present, 
is described as: 
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“very autocratic affair […] it‟s just the way it is in a company, works probably 
well […] the problem was just, that their decisions sometimes were not 
understandable for anybody […] lacking any logic” (leading engineer) 
 The strategic reorientation providing individual identification sources, leading to a changed but 
distinct organizational identity, noticeably strengthened or at all created through the reassignment 
of the workforce to jointly develop the new sportscar in a relatively management free 
atmosphere. Fact is, that the management encouraged their engineers to work on the sportscar 
project, and with this the organizational identity was reconstructed which is further explored form 
the employees viewpoint in the next section. It shall nevertheless be noted, that the absence of 
management fostered organizational identity construction among employees and simultaneously 
led to a deconstruction of organizational identity during the crisis as described later. 
 
Role of Employees in Identity Reconstruction Process 
The involuntarily shift from individual engineering tasks of various projects for external clients 
towards being team member of a group initially inspired everyone. The workforce integrated the 
goal to improve and build an entire handcrafted sportscar which should hit the world on a global 
scale into their own individual identity. This reassignment created a spreading achievement 
volition starting with the engineers, but infecting the entire organization like a virus, unifying 
employees across various departments and fostered an organizational identity. 
“I wanted to establish a new automobile brand from Saxony in the world…there 
was really the opportunity to make it happen.” (administrative staff) 
“to be able to roll with your own, self developed vehicle some meters forward 
and backwards” (leading engineer) 
“to construct a vehicle yourself and to see it driving […] dream job” (mechanic)  
This perception and engagement can be explained with an analysis of two major reasons on how 
the employees perceived themselves. First, the employees defined themselves as “the ones who 
make a dream drive”. Thereby the role of being solely employees shifted towards “explorers and 
entrepreneurs who reach for the world” rather than just being “sales person” or “engineer” 
working for the organization. It can be assumed that the self categorization towards “the ones 
who make a dream drive” was more appealing for the organizational members than simply being 
employed at an automotive engineering service provider somewhere in the nowhere of Germany. 
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Maslow describes with his need pyramid (1943) the ambition of individuals to self-actualize after 
their physiological and social needs are satisfied. In fact, all members found their physiological 
and safety needs initially satisfied and to an extent also a sense of belonging with regard to their 
families and friends. Subsequently, it appears to be a reasonable explanation to assume that the 
re-defined selves of being explorers, entrepreneurs and “the ones who make a dream drive” are 
part of their way to gain respect by an „out-group‟ (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), themselves and to 
build self-esteem, respectively.  
Second, organizational identity was also constructed indirectly by defining a very adverse picture 
of the out-group, in particular the German automobile industry. The industry was described as 
highly bureaucratic with little appreciation for the individual: 
“It was crucial for me that it was about a sportscar and that everything was on 
a small scale, so that you don‟t have to integrate into structures of a large 
corporation where you are only treated as number.” (Leading engineer) 
With the delineation from the traditional industry in conjunction with the entrepreneurial spirit 
described above, a strong sense of belonging, affiliation and group feeling was created with the 
central aim to succeed. This phenomenon can also be supported by latest research on „winning‟ 
(Malhotra et al, 2008). In fact, groups or organizations do not only develop a stronger 
organizational identity with higher distinctiveness, but they also develop stronger ambitions if the 
direct competitors seem to be impregnable as a few other very distinctive small volume 
automobile producer.  
Even though Alvesson and Willmott (2002) described these phenomena as more or less 
intentional “identity regulation” through targeting the employees and the social relations, we have 
come across a paradox. In fact, the management, as described above, was hardly involved in the 
process of identity regulation or at least in the process of encouraging the “make a dream drive” 
theme, but only became a passive part of it. It was obviously the case that the potential job 
candidates already applied with optimistic expectation to find (unachievable) challenges as 
reflected upon by the administrative staff: 
“Well, what we expected was hard work with blood, sweat and tears…and we 
assumed a too long time that it was in our hands.” 
This interpretation can also be strengthened by considering the firm holistically. As mentioned 
before, the organization was actually an engineering service firm with a core business to provide 
engineering services. Only a small part of the company was the automobile as business card. 
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However, the people who were hired for the engineering firm throughout the years, but 
reassigned to work for the automobile project. Subsequently, the organizational identity was re-
constructed from being part of an engineering service provider towards a “make a dream drive” 
identity for the automobile project. This development was further accelerated through a general 
lack of positive appraisals through the management as discussed in the e-mail therapy among 
several employees: 
“It is upsetting that nobody in this mailing list has ever heard words like „thank 
you for your good work‟ from the management.” (engineer, administrative 
staff) 
At the same time, the work for the automobile project was honored, hardly through the 
management, but through externals that admired the automobile and focused their positive 
attention on the results of all work: 
“…and how the automobile drew attention and with it our work was an 
extremely good feeling” 
Considering the employee‟s sources of identification it can be assumed that it was the 
organization to a certain extent the company in the beginning, which shifted increasingly more 
towards the automobile project. This was mainly due to the absence of intentional identity 
regulation, a strong desire by employees to have more appealing “make a dream drive” 
challenges and at last through a lack of appraisal for engineering service by the management 
whereas the automobile project drew attention from an outside audience and thereby enhanced 
the employee‟s self-esteem. This in turn led to a shifting management attention towards the 
automobile project. 
 
Sources of Identification 
In order to understand the source of identification in more detail, a recall on theory is suggested. 
We described the identification process in the theoretical framework and stated, that identification 
is 3-fold with self-categorization, integration of values and goals and affiliation (Edwards & 
Peccei, 2007). Even though it needs to be kept in mind that the reflections might be subject to 
distortion due to the bankruptcy, the initial and salient sources of identification can be defined as 
first the setting of the firm with a young, dynamic, entrepreneurial and flexible approach, second 
the automobile project and third the colleagues as interpreted from the interviews with the 
engineers, a mechanic and the administrative staff.  
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After the majority of engineers were assigned to the sportscar project a potentially more attractive 
source of identification – the new sportscar - emerged which was later on just referred to as “our 
baby” over various departments. The identification, as suggested in theory, was also in the 
investigated case 3-fold. The employees self-categorized themselves as “the ones who made it 
happen” moving away from being engineer of an engineering service provider. They also 
adapted the organizational goals with regard to deadlines, launching dates and the general 
mission to develop a running automobile. And finally, they also developed a strong affiliation 
towards the project that made them “proud”.    
 
5.2 Deconstruction of Organizational Identity 
Having analyzed and discussed the identity re-construction in favor of the automobile project, 
another aspect must be evaluated. We became interested in how the identity (project identity and 
organizational identity) continued to be constructed or deconstructed when the crisis became 
more dramatic during the final months. In this context, we want to introduce the notion 
“organizational identity deconstruction” as the employee‟s sources of identification gradually 
disappeared and led to a reserved organizational identity of the employees. Thereby we were 
particularly interested in reasons why the sources of identification shifted and to what extent. 
Similarly to the analysis of the re-construction process described above, we first take a critical 
stance regarding management and how the two founders contributed to the (de)construction and 
proceed with the employees to finally end with a brief analysis of the last sources of identification.  
 
Management Contribution to Organizational Identity Deconstruction 
The organization was characterized by a continuous absence of management. The marginal 
management during the identity re-construction process described in the last section was 
continued and even minimized during the identity (de)construction process during the last months 
before the organization filed bankruptcy.  
The absence of management was indeed affecting the organizational identity in various ways. As 
the management gradually missed to take regulating efforts like controlling, planning, task 
distribution, motivation, communication, employee involvement and adequate decision-making, 
the employees often felt left alone: 
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“We were not really managed…this could sometimes be interpreted as great 
freedom, but we also felt lost quite often.” (engineer, mechanic) 
Through the absence of management and leadership, the organizational identity (de)construction 
was indeed influenced indirectly. How was the absence interpreted by the employees? What did 
it mean for them? In fact, the employees were disappointed and alienated from the management 
which was synonymous for the entire organization. The workforce became systematically 
frustrated and could not find any reason why they should identify with or follow the management 
and organization as a whole. This is also reflected in the “e-mail therapy” after bankruptcy: 
“If the company is in danger to be filed for bankruptcy on a quarterly base and 
one has to defeat these, the management should wonder if it wound not make 
sense to close the whole business instead of artificially expanding the 
suffering and exploitation of their employees.” (engineer, administrative staff) 
Considering that the high-skilled workforce was conceivably young and inexperienced, it can also 
be assumed that they were seeking some sort of role model or leadership figure. The affronting 
behavior of the management, however, has just left them desperately seeking another attractive 
source of identification – possibly outside the firm. 
Another, additional interpretation further strengthens these findings. Alvesson and Empson 
(2008) argue that organizational identity is a dynamic and continuous process. In order to 
maintain a strong and salient organizational identity, it must be controlled and regulated as 
argued by Alvesson and Willmott (2002).  
During the re-construction process, as mentioned above, the organizational identity was, to an 
extent, regulated by the middle management. The middle management – the head of engineering 
(left end 2006) and head of sales (left end 2005) – translated the vision and fostered the identity 
construction. They also performed more or less transactional management and thereby ensured 
at least a basic structure (Burns, 1978). However, when the middle management left and the 
positions were not replaced again with capable and competent people, no active identity 
regulation was exerted. This comes close to natural identity deconstruction as the salient 
organizational identity was neither strengthened nor kept alive anymore: 
“Our company culture or identity had actually nothing to do with the 
management…they just did the administrative stuff.” (shop floor worker, 
mechanic, engineer) 
Identity (de)construction in Crisis Companies | Behrmann & Seidel (2009)                                                P a g e |  42  
 
All in all, the role of the management for organizational identity was relevant as it accelerated the 
deconstruction process through absence and lacking counteractions. It was not the case that the 
management actively contributed or shaped the deconstruction process. But lacking 
communication and misunderstood decision-making in conjunction with economical 
incompetence that continuously led to financial problems indeed fostered the identity 
deconstruction process. It also kept naturally motivated and identity-seeking employees from 
identifying with the management and organization and created an insuperable gap between 
management and employees.  
“They lived in their management spheres…and sometimes they descend from 
the oval office with a thrown over pullover.” (engineer, mechanic) 
 
Role of Employees in Identity Deconstruction Process 
Surprisingly, the skeptical attitude towards the management has hardly affected the identification 
with the automobile or ‟auto project identity‟ as salient sub-identity in the organization. Particularly 
the higher skilled employees in the sales and engineering department strongly identified with the 
automobile and their role in the project as mentioned before. The lower skilled employees were 
more neutral regarding their identification with the final product, but they dominantly identified 
with their task in the project. 
However, when the organization tumbled towards the crisis and signs of the crisis became 
obvious, the identity deconstruction also extended to the „auto project identity‟ and the task 
identification, including high- and low-skilled employees. The identity deconstruction process was 
thereby mutually overlapping and cannot be understood as detached phases. 
The early crisis indicators can be defined as stagnating sales numbers, quality problems and 
occasional payment delays for suppliers and employees. Even though the impact of the first 
signs was rather little, it caused latent reactions from the employees. Interestingly, the low-skilled 
workers were to some extent more sensitive and less willing to ignore early signs: 
“I have once bought something we needed for the car from a friend and then 
we couldn‟t pay the bill…that was the last time that I used personal contacts in 
the firm.” (shop floor worker) 
“Well, I didn‟t tell people anymore where I work and when I did before, they 
were somehow interested in the product…but looked at us degrading, so I 
didn‟t.” (mechanic) 
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The „auto project identity‟ was not presented anymore, but humbly hidden – an early but 
significant sign of identity deconstruction. In contrast, the high-skilled worker optimistically 
ignored the early signs and maintained the “make a dream drive” identity conceivably long: 
“It was enthusiasm for 2-3 years, then it was dampened slightly, but we simply 
ignored it for the next 2 years, and afterwards our enthusiasm towards the 
organization complanated, but the automobile remained on a podium almost 
until the end.” (engineer) 
However, when the crisis became stronger and the management faced financial problems, they 
reduced or blocked further investments in R&D (research & development) and marketing. The 
lacking financial resources led to a stagnation of the auto project and thereby the identity 
construction gained additional momentum. As explained before, the auto project identity was 
consistent of components; the automobile itself with all invested effort and the task orientation in 
the project or profession, respectively. With the stagnation due to financial resources, low- and 
high-skilled employees found themselves in the position in which they could not or only partly 
exert their profession and in which they could not improve the automobile itself. This had 
accelerating impact on identity deconstruction: 
“If you can‟t do it the way as it is required and best [because of money], then 
the identification with the product is certainly lowered.” (leading engineer) 
“If the roof breaks away during a test drive and rain is pouring in, because 
there is no money for further development […] I don‟t know how much one can 
identify with the product.” (administrative staff) 
Moreover, credibility doubts whether it was really possible to establish the automobile in the 
world were raised and the “we make a dream drive” identity was increasingly shaken even 
though with a delay of the high-skilled employees.  
About half a year before the company filed bankruptcy, even the last organizational members 
came to the conclusion that there was no hope to find the brand name of the automobile on 
national or international markets. Nevertheless they continued going to work in the last months 
for socializing and talking about the potential of the automobile. In fact, we got the impression 
that the last source of identification, the group identity, became the salient rest based on the 
shared experiences and social relations.  
“I still feel connected with the organization as all of you. And I was only there 
for about one year. Surprising.” (former head of sales) 
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We term this group identity “histological identity” as it was constructed amongst all left and 
remaining members throughout the last months. The histological group identity also continued 
after bankruptcy and many former employees also participated in the “e-mail therapy”. Thereby 
nearly all employees in the mailing list – about 25 people – seemed to share the same answer to 
the question who they are, like “We are the ones who made the car roll with so much love and 
engagement”.  
 
5.3 Attempt of Conceptualizing the Identity Shift in Segments 
Even though the organizational identity was constructed and deconstructed for nearly all 
employees, the timeframe and magnitude differed from person to person. The low-skilled 
employees thereby appeared to be extremely sensitive and deconstructed their identity 
conceivably quickly: 
“I had given everything to save this here, but it didn‟t work, so what should I 
have done?” (shop floor worker) 
The high-skilled employees with more functional responsibility on the other hand maintained their 
salient identity and started their identity deconstruction only when they could not, not even 
through improvising, continue their work anymore.  
“It is kind of frustrating if you can‟t do your job anymore, but it took a too long 
time to realize this” (engineer) 
This interpretation can certainly be contradicted with the argumentation that the organizational or 
project identity was weaker or not even existent beforehand for some low-skilled employees, but 
we would argue that even the weak or marginalized organizational identity was conceivably 
faster deconstructed and suggest additional research on this particular phenomenon. 
The differentiated view on the workforce can be displayed in a two-by-two matrix whereas one 
axis reflects the level of identification from low to high and the other axis reflects the functional 
responsibility within the firm. The level of identification was thereby chosen as indicator for 
organizational identity which can hardly be captured in a one-dimensional scale from low to high. 
The complementing axis with functional responsibility can be understood as indicator of 
education, profession and hierarchical position in the company. Thereby we hope to reflect the 
observed phenomenon that high-skilled worker with higher functions in the organization joined 
the organizational deconstruction process conceivably later than low-skilled employees. Even 
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though the matrix mainly reflects the individual identity construction, we argue that in a crisis, the 
organizational identity generally shifts towards a particular direction with a relative implication for 
all employees. The matrix serves to capture this general shift rather than the individual identity. It 
should not be understood as pure categorization and dividing up a “passive workforce” (Alvesson 
& Willmott, 2002), but more in terms of positions which are taken by organizational members 
crisis situations whereby the one or the other position becomes salient for individual 
organizational members and then for the entire organization. 
A similar matrix was suggested by Schaefer and Sommereng (2008). They describe one 
dimension as “affiliation” and the other as “locus of control”. The “affiliation” thereby correlates 
with our “identification” dimension. However, the matrix does not intend to capture a 
development, but rather provides a snapshot of where the self-identities are positioned. In our 
matrix, we argue that an ongoing shifting and re-positioning takes place whereas there is a 
general trend of the organizational identity that can be captured by considering the positions 
taken by organizational members.  
In the investigated case, a shift of all employees towards “passive neutralists” and “opportunistic 
selves” was observed. The “passive neutralists” hardly identify and do their low-level job. The 
“opportunistic selves” are high-skilled and joined or stayed in the company for the job title and a 
good future position at another company, monetary rewards which are paid or which are still 
outstanding and to an extent the learning experience. The “naive hopers” were the ones with 
limited responsibility and relatively low education, but who identified strongly with the 
organization or parts of it. Finally, the “self-sacrificing drivers” were the die-hards with high 
responsibility and high identification who were the driving force in good times and who held out 
“too long”. 
At the end, neither anyone identified with the organization, nor hoped for success of the project. 
Accordingly, the “naive hopers” joined the “passive neutralists” and the “self-sacrificing drivers” 
joined the “opportunistic selves” respectively and thereby slowed down and by the end stopped 
any business development. 
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The reason for the differentiated shift and different level of identification of low-skilled and high-
skilled employees might find explanation in higher involvement in the development and building 
process of the automobile and brand. The high-skilled employees who sometimes spend 70 
hours in the office subsequently dedicated more of their “personal life” to the firm (Watson, 2008). 
Thereby, they were less willing to accept a failure of the project as this had also meant that they 
personally failed. 
 
5.4 A Stable Source of Identification 
We have analyzed the rise and fall of organizational identity construction in the pre-crisis as well 
as crisis period. The process was characterized by continuous change and dynamics with (key) 
employees, suppliers, customers and supporters leaving. It created the impression that there 
were no stable variables, except perhaps the absence of management. However, there was one 
salient source of identification that remained stable from the beginning to the very end: learning 
by doing. The absence of management, the high employee turnover and the inexperienced 
workforce were a good fertilizer and indeed fostered organizational learning through 
experimenting, trial-and-error and learning by doing without mentionable restrictions: 
Illustration 5.1 | Crisis – (de)construction matrix  
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“We worked our butts off, we became „gofers‟…that was by all means positive. 
I believe that we couldn‟t have had a more diversified and educational job than 
this one… the bigger part was learning by doing, that‟s for sure!” (leading 
engineer) 
This was not only a dominant discourse in the engineering department, but in the entire 
organization: 
“I was a „girl for everything‟, I did the purchasing, I was responsible for the 
cash point, I did the warehouse stuff and all components issues, I wrote 
offers…that was always interesting, because we went to work every day and 
learned something new.” (shop floor worker) 
The employees usually referred to the notion of “Mädchen für Alles” what means “girl for 
everything” or “gofer”, respectively. They saw themselves as widely involved in all parts of the 
organization and thereby they felt also important and needed. With regard to Alvesson and 
Willmott‟s (2002) modes of identity regulation, the work was partly perceived as kind of education 
program from the beginning to the end. Despite all chaos and frustration, the ambition to learn 
and to go where there is no path was a stable and motivating source of identification with self-
enhancing effect on the organizational and particularly individual identity (de)construction. 
“Nobody can say we didn‟t gain experience and knowledge here, although it 
was stressful and hard sometimes. but I learned so much.” (engineer) 
Next to the prior explored internal organizational variables which affect the (de)construction of the 
individual organizational identity, this section focuses on individual and external influencing 
factors why employee stayed and suffered in the „sinking‟ organization. It further explores 
reasons why employees did not quit their job earlier and raises the question of the impact of 
individual variables on the organizational identity. Thereby four main factors were identified: work 
as hobby, financial independence and regional ties. 
 
5.5 Individual & External Variables Influencing Organizational Identity  
As indicated in the name, the individual variables influencing organizational identity 
(de)construction cannot be generalized, but only displayed exemplary on an individual or small 
group base. During the interviews, we noted that several employees strongly identified with their 
individual profession non-regarding the environment. This can best be illustrated by elaborating a 
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distinctive mechanic. He considered his job as sort of hobby with which he was able to self-
actualize: 
“It was the ultimate dream job for me, generally cars are topic number one for 
me, to produce a vehicle myself and to see it driving […] I would also have 
worked for a third of the money.” (mechanic) 
Even though he enjoyed his job, he never really identified with the organizational environment as 
result of his salient professional identity and hobby. Moreover he emphasized his distance 
towards the organization: 
“Identification, not at all with the company… I also don‟t identify myself with 
the sportscar very much, it‟s not my wavelength, the shape… once I drove… 
no, that‟s nothing for me. I would not buy it, but I assemble it the way that I can 
live with it.” (mechanic) 
The „hobby-factor‟ of the job was not only found at this employee, but also with other workers on 
various levels. Subsequently, the organization might have been only a platform for some 
individuals to exert their hobby and, as consequence, neither integrated the organizational 
identity nor made conceivable contributions to the organizational identity. 
Another factor was the need to earn money; however that would be ever possible. This was more 
relevant for low-skilled employees, but demonstrates why they were somehow distanced from the 
organization as such: 
“One year unemployment support was quickly over. I had no other choice than 
to start earning again. All what counted in the beginning was that I earn money 
gain […] I stayed in the company to receive my outstanding and delayed 
payments, when quitting my job, I would not have any chance to get the 
money.” (shop floor worker) 
The monthly salary for financial security was indeed for some employees the sole driving force to 
start working for the organization. When the organization faced the crisis and delayed salaries, 
the monetary factor became more dominant for multiple employees and they were afraid to 
receive nothing of the outstanding payments if they had left. Subsequently, anxieties to lose 
money became another reason why some employees did not leave – and this, of course, did not 
necessarily contribute positively to organizational identity construction. 
Another individual factor is inflexibility with regard to location. In fact, the regional ties quite 
dominantly determined the lives of some employees. They have their families, friends or 
relationship partners at the company location and could not at all imagine moving because of 
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that. Accordingly, they were more willing to accept the regional working conditions, as it was 
“more commodious to build cars in the same „village”. In our research, we have come across the 
importance of the way to work (the “Anfahrtsweg”): 
“The location was quite convenient, because I just had to drive about 10 km 
per day.” (mechanic, shop floor worker, engineer)  
The employees were indeed aware that there are better jobs somewhere else in Germany, but 
they also accepted worse working conditions in favor of the location, with the result that their 
organizational identification was not necessarily characterized by the absolute will to work for this 
specific company, but by not having a better choice with the self-defined limitations. 
These exemplary illustrated insides show the need for a complete human profiling, also 
considering personal education, experience and the exact personal circumstances to better 
understand and interpret the impact of personal variables on (de)constructing factors of 
organizational identity. We cannot clearly identify or generalize the impact of individual variables 
on the organizational identity (de)construction at this point without further in depth research, but 
we want to show how misleading „typical employee behavior expectations‟ in the context of a 
specific organization can be while not considering and analyzing different levels. 
It can further be assumed that the investigated company could or should have selected their 
employee more carefully, based on the individual qualification and motivation. Based on the 
limited identification concerning the company, one could either strongly criticize the human 
resource practices of the company or just ignore all this as „outlier‟. However, in any case the 
individual background needs to be considered when the (de)construction of organizational 
identity is analyzed. 
 
External variables influencing organizational identity  
As we explored on a theoretical level earlier, „external variables‟ can have noticeable impact on 
the organizational identity (de)construction. We distinguish between „economical situation‟ and 
„company location‟, starting with the governmental granted rural company site. One founder 
argues while being asked if the decision was right to establish the company at this particular 
East-German location:   
“The governmental support can be seen as solatium compensating the poorly 
educated employee in this region we have to cope with. Since the majority of 
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specialists moves to the Western part of Germany, just leaving a few regional 
bound well educated, but mainly unskilled village people for us. One might 
wonder if the „compensation pay‟ was enough to justify our decision to move 
East”  
This statement shows the inner conflict between receiving governmental support for an 
unfavorable location in the Eastern part of Germany one the one hand or having a free choice 
neglecting governmental support on the other. This decision might have made the founding of the 
organization possible, but in the end might be also one of the reasons why the organization was 
totally lacking experienced people which are key while developing a serious automobile and 
offering engineering services in this field.     
Reputable technical universities were in reach (~45 min drive) of the investigated organization, 
but the majority of fresh graduates were moving away, being more attracted to work in the 
western part of Germany. This ongoing trend is based on higher salaries and the density of 
potential employer in the West. This phenomenon just leaves some specialists and skillful 
graduates behind, which are most likely regionally bound, based on family and friends. One 
might assume that it has a noticeable impact on the individual‟s enthusiasm at work and 
respectively on the organizational identity construction.          
This goes straight in line with the overall regional „economic situation‟. In our particular case, the 
regional unemployment rate was twice as high compared to Germany‟s average unemployment 
rate. This already might make employees more aware of potential unemployment which could 
have led to more personal confessions in favor of the employer. Throughout the last year, the 
overall situation got even worse in the context of this particular case, considering the financial 
crisis. The crisis created uncertainties and fears among employees to become workless. 
Especially in this rural area, job security becomes focus to many employees doing whatever it 
takes to keep their jobs. Throughout the last months of the organization‟s existence, news were 
filled with horror stories about endangered car supplier and related businesses such as the 
investigated organization, reporting about bankruptcies on a daily basis. 
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6. Conclusion & Discussion 
Considering the current terminology of organizational scholars researching in the brought field of 
identity, one can increasingly find publications about the „construction‟ of organizational identity. It 
is becoming a hot topic being deeply explored, but not yet comprehensively understood. 
Interestingly, the vast majority of related research papers are based on positive empirical 
material which we wanted to contrast with a rather extreme case of a company facing a downturn 
scenario. After exploring various models and theories to build up our knowledge base about 
identity creation, we increasingly started to be skeptical towards the universal term „construction‟ 
which is used for describing any change of identity – strengthening, weakening and redirecting. 
In our particular company, the source of identification was shifted from being an engineering 
service provider towards becoming a solely automobile manufacturer. Is it right to describe the 
respective development of the organizational identity with the word „construction‟? Based on an 
underlying circular construction process one might understand the logic, but for our 
understanding it is the word „reconstruction‟ which is more appropriate and would like to 
introduce it in this context to describe a shift of organizational identity in which some parts are 
kept while others are neglected. 
Even going one step further, the explored company encountered a existential crisis and is 
bankrupt by now, people losing their hope, jobs and security, all affecting the organizational 
identity which we should frame with the term „construction‟. Considering individual identity, we do 
understand the argument that the identity is just differently weighted and therefore cannot be 
„deconstructed‟, but this is not necessarily the case with organizational identity. We argue that an 
organizational identity can be weakened and therefore should be described as „identity 
deconstruction‟, leading to the organizational trilogy of „construction, reconstruction and 
deconstruction‟ offering a logic and clear descriptive framework for our analysis. We would 
welcome organizational scholars to follow our approach, to make the in either way highly 
complex identity construction just a bit easier to grasp, which is sometimes just a matter of a 
simple but distinctive terminology. 
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Finding I - Sources of Identification 
With regard to existing research, we initially expected a strong and salient organizational identity 
with strong and homogeneous sources of identification, perhaps linked to the unique sportscar or 
the small firm seeking to find a niche position against the dominant competitors. However, when 
we analyzed the sources of identification, we soon realized that the identification with the 
organization itself was very limited. When the decision of a strategic reorientation was taken, the 
source of identification also shifted towards the automobile project and was hardly related to the 
organization as such. When the crisis hit and the sources of identification – like the automobile or 
profession – became redundant, the organizational identity also became fragmented, as we 
argue. At first, the people disconnected from the automobile project and raised doubts about its 
realism. This went hand in hand with an irreversible dissociation from the management. 
Secondly, the employees disconnected from the automobile. Only the group identity that we 
termed “histological identity” somehow survived the organizational deconstruction. 
 
Finding II - Inconsistent Deconstruction Among Employees 
The described identity deconstruction developed inconsistently. The variation can mainly be 
subscribed to the functional role of the employees. Thereby the higher the education, hierarchical 
position and responsibility, the longer and stronger the organizational members maintained their 
organizational identity and kept connected to the sources of identification. We suggested a two-
by-two matrix in which the functional role and level of identification correlate. The workers with 
strong identification and high functional responsibility we termed “self-sacrificing drivers” as they 
kept the business very long alive. The ones with strong identification but low functional role, we 
called “naïve hopers” who were lethargic without investing much energy, but still waiting for the 
positive turn. The ones with weak identification and low functional responsibility we named 
“passive neutralists” and with a high functional responsibility “opportunistic selves”, respectively. 
Thereby the described positions should not be understood as pure categories, but more in terms 
of salient positions which are taken by the organizational members in their organizational 
deconstruction process.  
 
Finding III - Absence of Management 
During the organizational identity construction and deconstruction process, the management took 
an ambiguous role. Indeed, the organization was characterized by the absence of management. 
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When the company did more or less well, this absence was positively enhancing organizational 
identity construction as employees found it easier to integrate the relatively weak organizational 
identity into their own identity and also to bring in their individual identity into the organizational 
identity. However, when it came to crisis and no active identity regulation was exerted, it came 
close to natural identity deconstruction as the salient organizational identity was not strengthened 
anymore, neither through frustrated employees because of the crisis, nor the management. Has 
the management had a choice? Considering the bankruptcy, we can certainly assume that 
renouncing on identity regulation and remaining absent was surely not the way to success, 
neither for organizational identity nor financial gains. 
 
Finding IV - External & Individual Variables 
The role of individual and external variables is often neglected when it comes to organizational 
identity (de)construction. External variables include for example the company location and 
general economic situation which might have massive impact on the company and respectively 
on the organizational identity as our case revealed. Locally bound employees were frightened by 
a comparable high regional unemployment rate in combination with a massive financial crisis 
destroying numerous automotive suppliers. These are important factors which should be taken 
into account while analyzing empirical material and organizational identity. Equally important and 
essential are individual factors, such as personal circumstances, education, preunderstanding 
and experience when it comes to an analysis of the organizational identity (de)construction. 
Employees have become subject to research on an individual level, while the findings are 
projected on a collective organizational level.  
It was not reasonable for us that these individual as well as external factors stay unnamed in 
many academic works, in case even distorting the analysis and respectively findings. We 
included for that reason relevant factors of the case in the analysis to create an authentic and 
comprehensive picture, giving the reader a possibility to fully follow and evaluate our findings and 
conclusions independently.                
 
Theoretical & Practical Relevance of Organizational Identity Research in Crisis  
In our paper, we have reviewed a broad variety of concepts and models. Thereby we have not 
only considered organizations, but also taken into account theoretical perspectives on individual 
identity construction and different levels of analysis. The research on identification and in 
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particular identity construction is not new, but has gained conceivable momentum over the last 
years. As organizational identity construction is seemingly complex, many researchers have tried 
to conceptualize the process in more or less simplified models and concepts (e.g. Alvesson & 
Empson, 2008; Lührman & Eberl, 2007; Empson, 2004; Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). However, 
most models and concepts were developed based on healthy and possibly successful firms and 
we wondered if they are also applicable and meaningful in crisis situations. 
We argue yes and no. The general assumptions concerning organizational identity and identity 
construction are also in crisis companies applicable. But there is a paradox or identity 
construction mystery. On the one hand, the defined sources of identification become less 
important for the employees in crisis situations as they increasingly disconnect from the 
organization. Thereby the management can exert limited identity regulation, because they simply 
do not have so much influence and power on the employees anymore. On the other hand, the 
employees also become increasingly sensitive towards behavior and actions of the management 
and other identity regulating forces in crisis situations. Thereby the management can benefit from 
the sensitivity and re-shape organizational identity easier and in this way, perhaps, construct a 
more beneficial organizational identity. The dimensions of organizational identity construction 
(Alvesson & Empson, 2008) and modes of identity control (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002), however, 
are equally applicable in crisis organizations as the general company setting usually remains the 
same regardless of the economic situation of the firm.  
Besides the confirmative stance towards theoretical models, there is also a practical relevance of 
identity research in crisis companies. The practical usability might not be obvious on the first 
glance, but we are sure that this has valuable implications for business recovery. It holds the 
potential that even though a company is bankrupt and distinctive employees left before, new 
investors potentially have the chance to recruit former key workers back and build on the existing 
organizational identity and unify the remaining employees – even if this might require a new 
management to create credibility. In the investigated case, nearly all employees were surprisingly 
open to return to the company under the condition that a new management is introduced. This 
indicates how forgivable organizational identity can be; a valuable information for consultants, 
investors and potentially a new management. 
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Outlook 
We have tried to contribute with this paper a small piece to the large identity puzzle, but there are 
many more to find by researchers and students around the world. In our theoretical framework 
and investigative analysis of the case, we have indeed encountered and identified various other 
pieces of the puzzle that we had liked to focus on, but could not due to time and space 
restrictions. These puzzle pieces were mainly related to the employees and the levels of 
analysis. In fact, organizational identity (de)construction is obviously depending on a number of 
individual variables of the workforce; thereby high-skilled and low-skilled employees with different 
levels of involvement and responsibility showed different reactions to the crisis in our case. It 
could be interesting to conduct further research in this area in order to understand this 
phenomenon more comprehensively and in order to give consideration to a diversified workforce 
with individual experiences, education, understanding, inspiration and profession. We could also 
imagine that the external variables will find more attention in organizational identity research as 
they are secondary, but still relevant factors. Particularly in our case, the external variables had a 
conceivable impact on organizational identity construction and we are sure that it is the same 
with other organizations. 
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